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Recent Decisions
Plaintiffs Need Not Show Egregious Conduct to
Seek Punitive Damages Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Kolstad v. American Dental
Association
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 -
EVIDENTIARY STANDARD REQUIRED FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER TITLE VII - The Supreme Court of the United
States held that a Title VII plaintiff need not show that the
employer's discriminatory conduct was egregious in order to seek
punitive damages, but under principles of agency law, an employer
cannot be vicariously liable for punitive damages for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents when
the managers' decisions are contrary to that employer's efforts to
comply with Title VII.
Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
Carole Kolstad ("Kolstad") lost a promotion because she is a
woman.' Kolstad was serving as the American Dental Association
("ADA") Director of Federal Agency Relations in September of 1992
when she learned that an ADA coworker, Jack O'Donnell
("O'Donnell"), would be retiring.2 Both Kolstad and Tom Spangler
1. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F3d 1431, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Kolstad
was an employee of the American Dental Association ("ADA"), a Chicago-based professional
association that maintains a Washington, D.C. office for the purpose of lobbying Congress
and assorted federal agencies on behalf of the members of the association. See id. Kolstad
sought a promotion to the position of Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and
Director of the Council on Government Affairs and Federal Dental Services. See id.
2. See Kolstad v American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2121 (1999). Jack O'Donnell
held the position of Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and Director of the Council
on Government Affairs and Federal Dental Services. See id. His duties included managing
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("Spangler"), a fellow employee in the ADNs Washington office,
expressed an interest in replacing O'Donnell.3 After both had
formally applied for the position, Leonard Wheat, acting head of
the Washington office, requested that Dr. William Allen ("Allen"),
the ADAs Executive Director, make the final decision.4  In
December of 1992, Allen notified Kolstad that Spangler had been
selected to replace O'Donnell. 5
Kolstad filed suit against the ADA in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,6 claiming that the decision to promote Spangler
instead of Kolstad constituted an act of employment
discrimination.7 The jury ultimately foiind that the ADA had
discriminated against Kolstad on the basis of gender in violation of
Title VII and awarded her $52,718 in backpay.8 The district court
denied Kolstad's request for a jury instruction on punitive damages
and her requests for reinstatement and attorney's fees.9
tri-annual meetings of the Council on Governmental Affairs and developing and
communicating ADA's positions on federal legislation and regulations affecting its members.
See Kolstad, 108 F3d at 1434.
3. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2122. Spangler was the ADA's Legislative Counsel, a role
that required him to be involved in the Association's legislative lobbying. See id. Both
Spangler and Kolstad worked with O'Donnell and both were given excellent performance
ratings by Leonard Wheat, acting head of the Washington office. See id.
4. See id. Dr. Allen was in charge of the Washington office from 1986 to 1988, holding
the dual position of Director of the office and Assistant Executive Director for Legislative
Affairs. Id. In 1988, he was asked to become the Assistant Executive Director in the ADA's
Chicago office. Despite his new position, he maintained a substantial presence in the
Washington, D.C. office and retained the position of Assistant Executive Director of
Legislation. Brief for Respondent at 6, .Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118
(1999) (No. 98-208).
5. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2122.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(a), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1994). To prove a prima
facie case of sex discrimination in promotion, the plaintiff must show that she is female, was
refused a position for which she was qualified and for which she applied, and that the
employer filled the position with a male employee. See Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1436.
7. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2121. Kolstad introduced evidence at trial that indicated
that Allen had modified the description of O'Donnell's job in a preselection procedure
designed to encourage the selection of Spangler. See id. Kolstad also introduced evidence
that Wheat told sexually offensive jokes and used derogatory terms to refer to certain
women. See id. In addition, Kolstad alleged that she had difficulty in gaining access to Wheat
and that Wheat had refused to meet with her for several weeks to discuss her interest in
O'Donnell's position. See id.
8. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123.
9. See id. Punitive damages are damages in excess of the amount required to
compensate a plaintiff for his injuries and are designed to punish the defendant for his
conduct. BLACK's LAw DIcMONAY 390 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 provides for punitive damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "if the
complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or
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The ADA appealed the jury verdict and Kolstad cross-appealed
on the district court's decision regarding punitive damages.10 In a
split decision, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's holding
regarding Kolstad's request for an instruction on punitive
damages." The circuit court, in an opinion written by Judge Tatel,
rejected the ADA:s argument that punitive damages are restricted
under Title VII to those cases where the defendant's conduct is
extraordinary or egregious. 2 The panel based its decision on a
"plain- meaning," interpretation of the statute, holding that "[hiaving
concluded that the jury could reasonably find from the evidence
that ADA intentionally discriminated against Kolstad, the district
court should have instructed the jury that . . . it could consider a
punitive award." 3
The court of appeals thereafter agreed to rehear the case en
banc, 14 limiting its review to the question of punitive damages.15
The en banc court, in a 6-5 decision, held that in order for the jury
to address the question of punitive damages, there must be a
demonstration that the defendant's conduct was egregious.' 6 In an
opinion written by Judge Williams, the court maintained that "by
enacting a separate provision setting out a special standard for the
imposition of punitive damages, Congress showed that it did not
intend to make punitive damages automatically available in the
standard case of intentional discrimination under Title VII."
17
discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(1) (1994).
10. See Kolstad, 108 E3d at 1434.
11. Id. at 1431.
12. Id. at 1438. The court held that the state of mind that is necessary to impose
liability for the discrimination is sufficient to make punitive damages applicable and that
because the jury could reasonably have found intentional discrimination, it should have been
allowed to contemplate punitive damages. Id.
13. Id. at 1438.
14. En banc "refers to a session where the entire membership of the court will
participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum .... In the United States, the
Circuit Courts of Appeal usually sit in panels of judges but for important cases may expand
the bench to a larger number, when they are said to be sitting en banc." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTioNARY 527 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
15. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F3d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
16. Kolstad, 139 F3d at 960. The Court found no evidence of egregious conduct in this
case. Id. The Court further held that, although evidence of pre-selection may allow an
inference that an employer's reasons for an employment decision were pretextual,
pre-selection alone is not egregiously wrong and is relevant only insofar as it supports an
inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 969.
17. Id. at 961.
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The United States Supreme Court granted Kolstad's petition for a
writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict among the federal courts of
appeals regarding the standard that must be met before a jury may
properly consider a request for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(1). 8 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether
punitive damages may be awarded at the jury's discretion in cases
of intentional discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act without a showing of egregious or outrageous conduct. 19 The
Kolstad Court held that, while punitive damages may be imposed in
a Title VII action without a showing of egregious or outrageous
discrimination independent of the employer's state of mind, there
must at a minimum be a showing that the employer discriminated
in the face of a perceived risk that its actions violated federal law. 20
The Court further found that the employer may not be vicariously
liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial
agents for the purposes of imposing punitive damages, provided
that the decisions are contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII.
21
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor began with
an analysis of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Act"). 22 Compensatory and punitive damage awards are limited by
the Act to cases of intentional discrimination.2 In the structure of
the Act, the Court found a congressional intent to limit punitive
awards to a subset of cases that involve intentional
discrimination. 4 Justice O'Connor further determined that Congress
intended to create two standards of liability; one for compensatory
damages and a higher standard for a punitive damages award.25
However, the Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' effort to
adhere to this two-tiered structure by limiting punitive awards to
18. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999). A "writ of certiorari" is a
discretionary order issued by the Supreme Court to a lower court, requesting that it certify
the record of the proceeding below. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1609 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123.
20. Id. at 2124-26.
21. Id. at 2129.
22. Id. at 2123-24. The 1991 Act allowed for additional remedies, including punitive
damages, for certain classes of Title VII violations. See id. at 2124.
23. Id. A party may recover punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) if she
demonstrates that the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of [the employee]." 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(1) (1994).
24. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124.
25. Id.
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cases of intentional discrimination of an egregious nature. 26 The
remedies that are available to a plaintiff are determined by the
intent of the employer in engaging in discrimination.2 7 The Court
held that, although egregious misconduct may be evidence of the
necessary mental state, the Act neither restricts plaintiffs to this
form of evidence nor requires a showing of egregious
discrimination independent of the employer's state of mind.28
Relying on Smith v. Wade,29 the Court recognized that punitive
damages may be considered when the defendant's conduct has
been proven to be malicious or recklessly indifferent to the
federally protected rights of others.30 Justice O'Connor stated that
the Smith Court did not find that a showing of actual malice was
necessary for a punitive damages award; however, the intent
standard required at least a showing of recklessness.31 The Court
cited several cases to demonstrate that eligibility for punitive
awards has consistently been determined by the defendant's motive
or intent and, while egregious misconduct may be associated with
punitive damages, it is not essential that the employer engage in
egregious or malicious conduct independent of a state of mind
before being subject to a punitive award.
32
It is essential, however, that a plaintiff show that the employer
knew there was a risk that its conduct violated federal
anti-discrimination laws.33 The majority recognized that a finding of
intentional discrimination will not always give rise to a jury
instruction on punitive damages.34 This gives rise to what amounts
to an ignorant employer defense.3 If. the employer was unaware
that its discriminating behavior was prohibited by federal law, the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Act requires only that the employer act with "malice or with reckless
indifference to the aggrieved individual's federally protected rights." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)
(1994). "Malice" is a state of mind that prompts a person to willfully do a wrongful act or to
intentionally violate a law, the result of which is injury to another person. BLACK'S LAW
DICTONARY 956-57 (6th ed. 1990).
29. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
30. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2125.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2126.
33. Id. at 2125.
34. Id.
35. Koistad, 119 S. Ct. at 2125. "The underlying theory of discrimination may be novel
or otherwise poorly recognized, or an employer may reasonably believe that its
discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational qualification defense or other statutory
exception to liability." Id.
2000 1107
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jury would not receive an instruction on punitive damages.36
The Court next addressed the issue of imputing liability37 for
punitive damages from Allen to the ADA.38 Justice O'Connor
observed that under the common law, agency principles have
limited vicarious liability for punitive awards.39 Furthermore, the
Court stated that Congress requires that federal courts interpret
Title VII based on agency principles and, consequently, strict limits
exist on the extent to which an agent's misconduct may be imputed
to the principal for awarding punitive damages.40 The majority
reasoned that holding employers liable for punitive damages when
they have engaged in a good faith effort to comply with Title VII is
inconsistent with the long-established common law principle of
limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages." The Court
consequently held that, regarding punitive damages, an employer
may not be held vicariously liable for discriminatory employment
decisions made by managerial agents when the agents' decisions
are contrary to the employer's bona fide efforts to comply with
Title VII. 42 The decision of the court of appeals was vacated and
the case remanded."
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, with whom Justice Clarence
Thomas joined, concurred in part and dissented in part." Chief
Justice Rehnquist would have held that the two-tiered scheme of
Title VII implies the existence of an egregiousness requirement that
restricts punitive damages to only the worst cases of intentional
36. Id.
37. "Imputed" means that an act is ascribed to a person not because he is responsible
for the act but because he is aware of it or a person over whom he has control is
responsible for the act BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2126.
39. Id. at 2127.
40. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that
[plunitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if. (a) the principal authorized the doing
and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless
in employing him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the
principal ratified or approved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1965).
41. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. 2128-29. "Where an employer has undertaken such good faith
efforts at Title VII compliance, it 'demonstrat[es] that it never acted in reckless disregard of
federally protected rights.'" Id. (citing Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 E3d at 974
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
42. Id. at 2129.
43. Id. at 2130.
44. Id. at 2130 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1108 Vol. 38:1103
2000 Kolstad v. American Dental Association 1109
discrimination.45 The Chief Justice agreed with the Court's opinion
that employer liability for punitive damages is significantly limited
by the principles of agency law.
46
Justice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined, concurred in part and dissented in part.47 Justice
Stevens agreed with the majority's decision to reject the court of
appeals' holding that under Title VII, a defendant's conduct must be
egregious before a jury may properly consider punitive damages.48
Justice Stevens maintained, however, that if the plaintiff proffers
sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that an employer acted
willfully, then the issue should go to the jury.49 With regard to
imputing liability to the ADA under principles of agency law,
Justice Stevens maintained that it was an issue that was not
addressed by either of the parties to the litigation and therefore
strongly disapproved of the Court's volunteering commentary on
the agency issue; he believed the proper action would have been
simply to remand the case on the issue of punitive damages
without the commentary.50
Dating back to ancient times, the issue of liability for damages
has its foundation in the concept of vengeance. 51 Even ancient
American Indians resolved disputes by negotiating damages in the
45. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2130 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
47. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 2132. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
found that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury may find that the ADA
acted with reckless indifference to Kolstad's federally protected rights. Id. at 2132 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Included in that evidence is the indication that
Kolstad was the more qualified of the candidates and that the ADA's decisionmakers were
known to tell sexually offensive jokes, refer to professional women in a derogatory fashion,
and manipulated the job requirements in an effort to hide their misconduct. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 2130, 2132-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The
absence of briefing or meaningful argument by the parties makes this Court's gratuitous
decision to volunteer an opinion on this nonissue particularly ill advised." Id. at 2133
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. See 1 MF ViN M. BELu, MODERN DAmAGES, 65-66 (1959). In The Common Law, Justice
Holmes stated that
[i]t is commonly known that the early forms of legal procedure were grounded in
vengeance. Modem writers have thought that the Roman law was gestated in the
"blood feud," and all authorities agree that the German law began in that way. Feud
led to composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud violence was
bought off. Composition recovered, then was the alternative of vengeance. Vengeance
imports a feeling of blame.
Id. at 66 (quoting HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW, 3 (1881)).
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form of property.52 Within the traditional judicial system, American
courts have a long history of awarding punitive damages in
addition to compensatory damages, as illustrated by the 1897
Supreme Court case Scott v. Donald.5 In Scott, James Donald
sought compensatory and punitive damages from defendants Scott
and Gardner, claiming that the South Carolina law under which
defendants seized several packages of wines and liquors belonging
to Donald was unconstitutional.5
The Court asserted jurisdiction over the issue of exemplary
damages, stating that "[i]n a case in which the law of a state is
claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United
States . . . we have jurisdiction of the entire case, and of all
questions involved in it."55 In an opinion delivered by Justice
George Shiras, the Court held that the plaintiff, in importing wine
and liquor for his own use, had exercised his legal rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and that the
defendants had acted knowingly, willfully, and maliciously in
seizing the plaintiff's packages.56 Justice Shiras maintained that
damages are said to be exemplary and allowable under common
law in excess of the actual loss if the injury is the result of "evil
motive, actual malice, deliberate violence, or oppression."5
While punitive damages were generally permitted at common law
when conduct was found to be egregious, plaintiffs bringing actions
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were limited to
equitable relief.58 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made a number of
changes to Title VII, including the creation of a provision
permitting compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII claims.59
52. See id. at 67. The Comanches, part of the Shoshonean group of tribes until the
eighteenth century, computed damages for a husband whose wife had committed adultery by
having the husband and lover bargain it out for a settlement. See id. The husband was given
the option of killing the lover instead of settling for property, but if he were to take that
option, the lover's family would be entitled to kill the husband. See id.
53. 165 U.S. 58 (1897). Plaintiff sought to recover damages caused when defendants,
constables of the State of South Carolina, seized and carried away several packages of wine
and liquor belonging to the plaintiffs and in the possession of railroad companies which had
brought the packages within the State. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 72-73.
56. Id. at 78-82.
57. Id. at 86.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected
employees from discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin and religion.
As originally enacted, it provided only equitable relief, not allowing for punitive damages. See
id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994). In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) provides
1110 Vol. 38:1103
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Since that time, the standard which has been applied in awarding
punitive damages under Title VII has been that set forth by the
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Smith v. Wade.60
Daniel R. Wade was an inmate at Algoa Reformatory who was
harassed, beaten, and sexually assaulted by his cellmates. 61 He
brought suit against William H. Smith, a guard at Algoa, alleging
that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated.62 The issue
confronted by the Court was whether Smith could be held liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 19836 for punitive damages based on a finding of
reckless or careless disregard or indifference to Wade's rights or
safety.64 In his argument, Smith maintained that the instruction to
the jury that punitive damages could be awarded on a finding of
reckless or callous disregard or indifference to Wade's rights was
erroneous.6 Smith further argued that deterrence and punishment,
the dual purpose of punitive damages, would be served only if the
standard for punitive damages was higher than the underlying
standard for liability in every case.6
Writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan explained
that the common law does not require a higher standard for
determining punitive damages than for determining compensatory
damages.67 Furthermore, the Smith Court held that a jury should be
permitted to assess punitive damages when the defendant's conduct
is shown to be motivated by evil motive or involves reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.6
the following:
In an action brought by a complaining party under ... the Civil Rights Act of 1964...
against a, respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . . the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages... in addition
to any relief authorized by... the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent ....
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a
respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if
the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 arose from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 and was
conceived for the purpose of creating tort liability in favor of persons deprived of federally
secured rights. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 34.
64. See Smith, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
65. See id. at 37.
66. See id. at 51.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 56. The Court further held that this measure of punitive damages applies
2000 1111
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Now-Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, explaining that the
proper standard for an award of punitive damages under section
1983 requires a degree of bad faith or evil motive on the part of the
defendant, and mere reckless disregard of the plaintiff's federally
protected rights should not be enough.69
In Williamson v. Handy Button Machine Co.,70 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the standards
articulated in Smith and allowed punitive damages under Title VII
upon a showing of willful wrongdoing or reckless indifference to
the plaintiffs known rights.7" In Williamson, the Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of
willful wrongdoing or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's known
rights to support the submission of punitive damage instructions to
the jury and to support an award of $100,000 in punitive damages
for intentional discrimination. 72 The court applied the Smith
standard and held that the evidence was sufficient to permit the
submission of the question to the jury, despite the open-ended
nature of the jury instruction.73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered the issue of punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
("Section 1981") in Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc.74
Stephens, an African American, asserted that South Atlantic had
violated both Title VII and Section 1981 by firing him from his
position as a truck driver for no other reason than his race.75
even when the standard of liability for compensatory damages is one of recklessness. Id.
69. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent repeats the holding
from Scott, 165 U.S. 58 (1897), that actual malice is a prerequisite to a recovery of punitive
damages and maintains that a majority of jurisdictions take the view that the standard for an
award of punitive damages includes a requirement of actual malice. Id. at 75 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
70. 817 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1987).
71. See id.
72. See Wiliamson, 817 E2d at 1290. Beatrice Williamson had worked at the Handy
Button Machine Co. as an assembly operator for twenty-one years. See id. Williamson, an
African-American, was kept in the plant's lowest paying job, despite her seniority, and was
repeatedly passed over in favor of white employees for better jobs. See id. As a result of
this treatment, Williamson suffered mental deterioration and was subsequently unable to
work. See id.
73. See id.
74. 848 F2d 484 (4th Cir. 1988). South Atlantic Canners, Inc. (South Atlantic), a
company that makes canned soft drinks for franchisees of Coca-Cola, USA, hired Marion
Stephens, Jr. in June, 1978 as a part-time truck driver and eventually promoted him to
full-time driver. See id. South Atlantic terminated him in September 1982, maintaining that
his job performance was unsatisfactory. See id. Stephens alleged that several white truck
drivers had similar records and were not discharged. See id.
75. See id. at 488.
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Although Title VII actions prior to 1991 were limited to equitable
relief, an action under Section 1981 provides for equitable and legal
relief, which includes compensatory and punitive damages.
7 6
Following Smith, the Fourth Circuit held that punitive damages are
recoverable under Section 1981 for malicious conduct, evil motive,
or reckless indifference to a federally protected right.71 In view of
the record, however, the Fourth Circuit found no evidence of
malicious conduct or reckless indifference; therefore, although the
court upheld the award of compensatory damages, Stephens was
not entitled to punitive damages. 78
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit addressed the same issue seven years later in Barbour v.
Merri//.79 Plaintiff Martin Barbour was awarded compensatory and
punitive damages after a jury found that Medlantic Management
Corporation and Mark Merrill had violated Barbour's rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 by failing to hire him as Medlantic's Director of
Corporate Materials Management because he is African-American.80
On appeal, defendants asserted that the evidence did not support
the imposition of punitive damages.
8 1
The D.C. Circuit stated that the defendants' assertion was based
upon a misunderstanding of the standard expressed in Smith for
awarding punitive damages. 82 The court was one of the first circuit
courts to hold that evidence sufficient to establish an intentional
violation of protected civil rights may also be sufficient to permit
the jury to award punitive damages.83
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion
76. See id. at 489.
77. Id. Judge Willdns, writing for the Fourth Circuit, maintained that punitive damages
are an extraordinary remedy designed to punish and deter particularly egregious conduct;
therefore, not all Section 1981 cases require that punitive damages be submitted to a jury. Id.
at 490.
78. Id. at 492. The court found substantial legitimate reasons for South Atlantic's
decision to terminate Stephens, including the facts that Stephens was warned seventeen
times that he had violated company policies, that company customers and other motorists
had contacted South Atlantic to report problems with Stephens, and that he was ultimately
discharged "after causing $60,000.00 damage to a company vehicle." Id. Based on these
circumstances, the Fourth Circuit held that "the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages is
not appropriate." Id.
79. 48 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 1277.
83. Id. (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 53). The court further explained that should




in Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Services.84 Initially, the
jury awarded Jonasson $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages.85 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3)(c),
total damages are capped at $200,000; consequently, the district
court reduced the award of compensatory damages to $100,000, but
left the award of punitive damages at $100,000.86 The defendant
argued that the district court erred in reducing the amount of
compensatory damages and not also reducing the amount of
punitive damages.87 The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's
decision to preserve the jury's determination that the judgment of
the court should reflect both punitive damages and compensatory
damages.88 Furthermore, the court found that the jury's decision to
award punitive damages was clearly warranted and should be left
undisturbed.
8 9
Finally, in a case very similar to Kolstad v. ADA, 90 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed punitive
damages under Title VII in Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.91 In a
suit for sexual discrimination based on both federal and state law,
Kimzey alleged that her supervisor and manager engaged in several
incidents of offensive conduct including kicking her leg, making
kissing noises at her, making sexual comments, and speaking to
her using abusive language.92 Wal-Mart appealed from a judgment
awarding Kimzey compensatory and punitive damages, claiming
that Kimzey failed to produce sufficient evidence of a hostile work
environment and that punitive damages were incorrectly submitted
to the jury.93.The Eighth Circuit noted that Title VII permits punitive
84. 115 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1997). The nine plaintiffs were all employed by Lutheran
Child and Family Services ("LCFS") in different capacities. See id. Louis Kingsboro was the
principal of Lutherbrook School, a school run by LCFS. See id. at 436. In 1993, Annette
Rops, assistant director of personnel, told her supervisor that Kingsboro was sexually
harassing her daughter, also an employee of LCFS. See id. Following an investigation, others
came forward with harassment complaints, which gave rise to this action. See id. Plaintiffs
alleged that LCFS did not take timely action in response to the sexual harassment. See
Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 436. A jury awarded each of the plaintiffs compensatory and punitive
damages. See id. at 441.





90. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
91. 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997).
92. See Kimzey, 107 F3d at 570. Kimzey further charged that this behavior upset her
to such a degree that she was forced to quit her job. See id.
93. See id. at 572. The jury awarded Kimzey $35,000 in compensatory damages and
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damages only when an employer is found to have "engaged in a
discriminatory practice with malice or with reckless indifference to
the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."94 Applying
that standard, the court found that the necessary level of
recklessness could be inferred from management's participation in
the discriminatory conduct, and that "[tjhere was sufficient
evidence to support the [punitive damages] claim going to the jury
under either state or federal law."9
5
The issue of vicarious liability that was raised by the Kolstad
majority opinion was dealt with somewhat differently in prior
Supreme Court cases, including Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.98
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Meritor held that an employer is absolutely liable for sexual
harassment practiced by supervisory personnel.97 The circuit court
reasoned that a supervisor is an agent for Title VII purposes even if
that agent lacks authority to hire, fire, or promote.98 The Supreme
Court, although failing to set a definitive standard for vicarious
liability under Title VII, disagreed with the court of appeals and
held that while the mere existence of a policy against
discrimination should not automatically insulate the petitioner from
liability, agency principles should not be completely disregarded
and absolute liability imposed on employers regardless of specific
circumstances.99
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court came closer to
establishing a standard for vicarious liability under Title VII in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.10 Kimberly Ellerth quit her
job as a salesperson at Burlington Industries, claiming that she had
been subjected to continual sexual harassment by one of her
$50,000,000 in punitive damages; "[aifter trial the district court reduced the punitive damages
award to $5,000,000." See id. at 570.
94. Id. at 575 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)).
95. Id. at 575-576. However, the circuit court found that the (reduced) punitive
damages award of five million dollars was excessive under both federal and state law, and
remanded the case for the district court to reduce the award to the "reasonable amount" of
$350,000. Id. at 578.
96. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Vinson, a female bank employee, brought a sexual harassment
suit against Meritor, claiming a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
seeking injunctive relief and damages. See id. at 60.
97. See id. at 62.
98. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. Vinson contended that Title VII's definition of
"employer" includes any "agent" of the employer and that the bank should therefore be
liable. Id. Meritor asserted that Vinson's failure to use its established grievance procedure
protected the bank from vicarious liability. Id.
99. Id.
100. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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supervisors.1'0 The issue presented to the Court was whether, under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,102 an employee who is
subjected to unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor, yet
suffers no adverse job consequences, can recover against the
employer without showing that the employer was negligent or
otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions.
1°3
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that
an employer is subject to vicarious liability for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate or
successively higher authority over the employee. 1°4 Justice Kennedy
relied on the "aided in the agency relation" standard, which
requires that the hostile environment result in tangible employment
action against the employee. 05 Justice Kennedy further explained
that when no tangible employment action has been taken against
the employee, an employer may raise an affirmative defense
comprised of two elements: (1) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent the harassment, and (2) that the-plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive
opportunities that the employer provided.
106
Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined,
dissented, based upon a belief that the affirmative defense was not
adequately defined. 10 7 Justice Thomas maintained that the standard
of employer liability should simply be that the plaintiff must prove
that the employer was negligent in allowing the supervisor's
conduct to occur.0
In Kolstad v. ADA,'09 the Supreme Court struck a necessary
balance between the interests of the employer and the rights of
employees under Title VII. While plaintiffs no longer must prove
that the discriminatory conduct was egregious, employers may not
be held liable for punitive damages for the conduct of their
101. See id.
102. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1994).
103. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 747.
104. Id. at 765.
105. Id. at 759. Under the "aided in the agency relation" standard for vicarious liability,
more than mere presence of an employment relation is necessary. Id. The supervisor's
discriminatory act must result in a tangible employment action against the employee. Id. at
756 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 219 (1965)).
106. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765. The Court added that if a tangible employment action
has been taken, such as discharge or demotion, then there is no affirmative defense
available. Id.
107. Id. at 766-767. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. 2118.
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managers when that conduct is counter to the employers' good
faith effort to comply with Title VII. The effect of the new
standards for punitive damages is to encourage employers to
implement effective discrimination prevention programs. The
Court's use of principles of agency law to address the punitive
damages issue, while creative, was not improper. In keeping with
common law, punitive damages should have a higher standard than
that for liability, but the plain meaning of Title VII would not allow
it. The Court applied agency principles to reach a just result and
correct a legislative oversight.
The Court has theoretically succeeded in limiting the cases in
which punitive damages may be considered and awarded, which is
in keeping with the legislative intent of Title VII. Given the
extensive awareness of the existence of federal antidiscrimination
laws, however, it will be difficult for employers to prove that their
agents were not discriminating in the face of a perceived risk that
their conduct violated a federally protected right. Furthermore, the
employer's defense that the agent's conduct was inconsistent with
the employer's good faith efforts to comply with the discrimination
law may be difficult to establish. Ultimately, the Court's decision in
Kolstad was correct and took an important first step in clarifying
the award of punitive damages in a Title VII action.
Laura A. Maines
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